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A Study on the Delimitation of 
the Sea of Japan
ZHANG Weiqiang *
Abstract: Due to historical reasons, State interests, and other considerations, 
the States surrounding the Sea of Japan have barely delimited their overlapping 
claims over this sea. Additionally, few scholars have attempted to delimit the 
overlapping areas under question in accordance with the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Given this context, the author takes this 
opportunity to delimit these overlapping areas pursuant to UNCLOS and relevant 
international maritime delimitation precedents, providing a concrete and plausible 
delimitation proposal. 
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Bordered by Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia, the Sea of Japan 
is a typical marginal sea.1 Owing to the Japan-Korea sovereignty dispute over 
Takeshima/Tokdo, the Russia-Japan territorial dispute over the Southern Kuriles/
Northern Territories, and historical conflicts between North and South Koreas, 
the States neighboring the Sea of Japan appear to have suspended delimitation of 
their overlapping maritime zones. And the effectiveness of earlier delimitation 
agreements concluded between Japan and South Korea and between North Korea 
and Russia remain controversial. After introducing and analyzing overlapping 
maritime claims and previous delimitation attempts by the States concerned, this 
paper applies the delimitation method successfully used in maritime delimitation 
*       ZHANG Weiqiang, a lawyer with Zhong Lun Law Firm Shanghai Office. Email: 
zhangwq5@126.com.
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1       A marginal sea refers to a maritime area located on the margin of oceans and lands. It is a 
sea adjacent to a continent and partially enclosed by islands, peninsulas or island arcs. Other 
typical marginal seas include East China Sea and Sea of Okhotsk. See Kobayashi Kazuo 
and Kazuaki Nakamura, translated by Fang Xiaoti, Expansion and Structure of Marginal 
Seas, Offshore Oil, Vol. 3, 1984, pp. 41~48. (in Chinese)
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cases before international courts or tribunals, attempting to delimit these 
overlapping areas in the Sea of Japan. The author hopes this attempt will encourage 
other scholars to make their own valuable contributions toward resolving this issue.
I. Geographical and Geological Conditions 
    in the Sea of Japan 
The Sea of Japan lies on the geographical coordinates of latitude 34°26'~51°41' 
N and longitude 127°20'~142°15' E. It is bounded by Sakhalin island, the Japanese 
archipelago, the Korean Peninsula, and the east coast of Siberia.2 The sea extends 
northeast-southwestward and has an area of about 1,000,000 km2, an average depth 
of 1,350 m, and a maximum width of about 550 nautical miles (nm) from west to 
east.3 It is connected to other seas by six straits. From north to south, these straits 
are the Strait of Tartary/Tartar Strait, La Perouse Strait/Soya Strait, Tsugaru Strait, 
Kanmon Strait, Tsushima Strait, and the Korea Strait.4 (see Fig. 1)
Fig. 1    Location Map of the Sea of Japan5
2       Oceanographic Atlas of the Bering Sea, Okhotsk Sea and Japan/East Sea, at http://pacificinf
o.ru/data/cdrom/2/HTML/e_4_00.htm, 1 April 2015.
3      Li Linghua, Maritime Delimitation Issue concerning the Sea of Japan, Marine Information, 
No. 2, 1998, p. 28. 
4       Sea of Japan, at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/sjp.html, 1 April 2015.
5       At http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sea_of_Japan_Map_en.png, 1 April 2015.
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The Strait of Tartary is bordered by the Russian island of Sakhalin and the 
Asian mainland. Delimiting overlapping maritime zones in this strait does not 
present a problem since the strait lies wholly within Russian territory. In addition, 
three straits lie wholly within Japanese territorial seas or exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ). These straits include the Tsugaru Strait, between Hokkaido and Honshu, 
Kanmon Strait, between Honshu and Kyushu, and Tsushima Strait, between 
Kyushu and Tsushima. Given that maritime control over these four straits is not 
contested, this paper will not elaborate further on these areas.6 However, the 
remaining two straits are contested. These straits include La Perouse Strait which 
separates the Russian island of Sakhalin from the Japanese island of Hokkaido, 
and the Korea Strait which lies between Japan’s Tsushima Island and the Korean 
Peninsula. At their narrowest points, the width of these two straits is less than 
200 nm. Given that these States have overlapping maritime claims over these two 
straits, further discussion on how to delimit their maritime boundaries is required.  
A. La Perouse Strait
La Perouse Strait, lying on the geographical coordinates of latitude 45°~46°20' 
N and longitude 142°20'~143°40' E, is a strait dividing the Russian island of 
Sakhalin from the Japanese island of Hokkaido. The strait’s northernmost point is 
Krillion Cape, Sakhalin, Russia, and its southernmost one is Soya Cape, Kyushu 
Island, Japan. The strait connects the Sea of Japan with the Sea of Okhotsk. It is 
approximately 23.2 nm wide at its narrowest point and is less than 200 meters deep. 
From east to west, its depth gradually increases.7 (See Fig. 2)
6     Notwithstanding the fact that Tsugaru Strait and Tsushima Strait are located between 
Japanese territories, in accordance with the Law on the Territorial Sea enacted by Japan in 
1977, each of the two straits has a territorial sea of three nm rather than 12 nm. It means 
that the two straits are straits used for international navigation, and vessels may enjoy right 
of transit passage in these straits. See Law on the Territorial Sea of Japan (Law No. 30 of 2 
May 1977), at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/
JPN_1977_Law.pdf, 1 April 2015. [hereinafter “Law on the Territorial Sea of Japan 1977”]
7       Jiang Yingxin, Three Main Straits in Japan, World Affairs, No. 10, 1980, p. 27. (in Chinese)
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Fig. 2    a) Location Map of La Perouse Strait  b) Bathymetric Map for La 
Perouse Strait; the black dots indicate the trough of the Strait8
The Law on the Territorial Sea,9 enacted by Japan in 1977, specifies that a 
3 nm territorial sea limit, rather than the usual 12 nm limit, shall be applied to 
the La Perouse Strait. Russia, however, in accordance with its Federal Act on the 
Internal Maritime Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the Russian 
Federation (1998),10 uses a 12 nm territorial sea limit. The laws of these two 
States create about 8.2 nm of overlapping EEZ claims at the narrowest point of La 
Perouse Strait. According to Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),11 La Perouse Strait is a strait used for international 
navigation.12 Connecting the Sea of Japan with the Sea of Okhotsk, the strait serves 
as an important passage through which the Russian navy and various East Asian 
8       Jiang Yingxin, Three Main Straits in Japan, World Affairs, No. 10, 1980. (in Chinese)
9        Law on the Territorial Sea of Japan 1977.
10    Federal Act on the Internal Maritime Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the 
Russian Federation, 17 July 1998, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTRE
ATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1998_Act_TS.pdf, 1 April 2015.
11     United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, 1 April 2015. 
[hereinafter “UNCLOS”]
12    As per Article 37 of UNCLOS, straits used for international navigation are straits lying 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone which are used for international navigation. The 
regime of transit passage is applicable to such straits. See Malcolm N. Shaw, International 
Law, 6th edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 575~578.
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commercial vessels enter the Pacific Ocean, therefore it occupies a critical and 
strategic position. 
B. Korea Strait
Tsushima Island splits the Korea Strait13 into two parts, the Western Channel 
and the Eastern Channel (also known as the Tsushima Strait).14 The Eastern 
Channel sits between Tsushima Island and Kyushu Island, and the Western 
Channel separates the Korean Peninsula from Tsushima Island. The Korea Strait 
connects the Sea of Japan with Yellow Sea, and thus it is an important international 
waterway. In this paper the Korea Strait refers to the Western Channel and 
Tsushima Strait refers to the Eastern Channel. The Korea Strait is about 20 nm 
wide at its narrowest point.15 Its western part is relatively flat compared to its steep 
eastern part. From west to east, its depth gradually increases, reaching 200 meters 
near Tsushima Island.16 (See Fig. 3)
In line with the Law on the Territorial Sea of Japan 1977, Japan claims a 
3-nm territorial sea in the Korea Strait.17 A presidential decree of South Korea 
also declares that it only claims a 3-nm territorial sea in the Korea Strait.18 These 
claims result in an overlapping EEZ of approximately 14 nm at the Korea Strait’s 
narrowest point. 
13     The strait situated between the Korea Peninsula and Kyushu Island is called Tsushima Strait 
by the Japanese, and the one lying between the Korea Peninsula and Tsushima Island is 
called the Western Channel by the Japanese and Busan Strait by the two Koreas. 
14   Park S.C., Yoo D.G., Lee C.W. and Lee E.I., Last Glacial Sea-Level Changes and 
Paleogeography of the Korea (Tsushima) Strait, The Journal of Geo-Marine Letters, Vol. 
20, Issue 2, 2000, p. 66.
15     Lee Seo-Hang, Korea’s Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, Korean Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 18, 1990, p. 67.
16     Yoo Dong-Geun and Park Soo-Chul, High-Resolution Seismic Study as a Tool for Sequence 
Stratigraphic Evidence of High-Frequency Sea-Level Changes: Latest Pleistocene-Holocene 
Example from the Korea Strait, Journal of Sedimentary Research, Vol. 70, No. 2, 2000, p. 
296.
17      Law on the Territorial Sea of Japan 1977.
18      Enforcement Decree of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Act, Presidential Decree No. 
9162, 20 September 1978 – Amended by Presidential Decree No. 13463, 7 September 1991, 
by Presidential Decree No. 15133, 31 July 1996, and by Presidential Decree No. 17803, 
18 December 2002, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/KOR_2002_Decree.pdf, 1 April 2015.
A Study on the Delimitation of the Sea of Japan 375
Fig. 3    Geographical and Geological Conditions in the Korea Strait19
Additionally, the Sea of Japan has three major basins: the Japan Basin in 
the north, the Yamato Basin in the southeast, and the Tsushima Basin (Ulleung 
Basin) in the southwest. These basins are separated from each other by the 
Yamato Rise. The Yamato Basin is 2,500~2,700 meters deep. The Japan Basin is 
19     Yoo Dong-Geun and Park Soo-Chul, High-Resolution Seismic Study as a Tool for Sequence 
Stratigraphic Evidence of High-Frequency Sea-Level Changes: Latest Pleistocene-Holocene 
Example from the Korea Strait, Journal of Sedimentary Research, Vol. 70, No. 2, 2000.
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the deepest part of the sea with depths greater than 3,000 meters. The Tsushima 
Basin is the shallowest part of the sea with depths less than 2,000 meters (See Fig. 
4).20 The following map indicates that the bottom of the sea is relatively flat and 
unfragmented. 
Fig. 4    Geographical and Geological Conditions in the Basins of 
the Sea of Japan21
20     Liu Fushou, The Characteristics of Geological Structure in Japan Sea, Coastal Engineering, 
No. 1, 1995, pp. 37~38. (in Chinese)
21     Dong Jinsheng and Xu Jiajia, Seasonal Variation of Volume Transport through Straits arou-
nd Japan Sea Using Variational Algorithm, Transactions of Oceanology and Limnology, No. 
1, 2011, p. 14. (in Chinese)
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II. Issues concerning the Delimitation of the Sea of 
     Japan among Its Neighboring States 
A. Boundary Delimitation Issues between Japan and South Korea
Due to historical grievances alongside other reasons, Japan and South 
Korea did not negotiate over their overlapping maritime claims between the 
end of World War II and the early 1970s.22 In the early 1970s, necessitated by 
the exploration and exploitation of fishing resources in the Sea of Japan and the 
northeastern part of Yellow Sea, motivated by the discovery of oil resources 
in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, and facilitated by the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, the two States were eager to 
resolve their overlapping maritime claims. On 30 January 1974, they signed the 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning the Establishment 
of Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two 
Countries (hereinafter referred to as the “Japan-Korea Agreement concerning the 
Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part”).23 On the same date, they also 
signed the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning Joint 
Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two 
Countries (hereinafter referred to as the “Japan-Korea Agreement concerning 
Joint Development of the Southern Part”).24 Reading the text of the Japan-Korea 
22   On 18 January 1952, when Japan and South Korea were discussing normalizing their 
diplomatic relations, South Korea suddenly issued the Presidential Proclamation of 
Sovereignty over Adjacent Seas, declaring that it held national sovereignty over the natural, 
mineral, fishery and other resources in the seas adjacent to the Korea Peninsula and on 
the continental shelf reaching up to 199 nm from its coast (the so-called “Syngman Rhee 
Line”). This proclamation also said that South Korea had jurisdiction over Takeshima 
(“Dokdo” in Korea), although its sovereignty was disputed. Needlessly to say, this 
proclamation added severe obstacles to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between 
the two countries. For details, see [Japanese] Ishimaru Kazuto et al eds., Japan’s Proactive 
Diplomacy, Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, Vol. 2, Tokyo: Sanseido, 1983, p. 299 (in 
Japanese). Quoted in Song Chengyou, Jiang Xin, Wang Lei et al., History of Sino-Korean 
Relations, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 1997, p. 74. (in Chinese)
23    Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning the Establishment of 
Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/jap-
kor1974north.pdf, 1 April 2015.
24     Agreement concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf 
Adjacent to the Two Countries, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREA
TIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/jap-kor1974south.pdf, 1 April 2015.
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Agreement concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part, we can find that 
this agreement solely addresses joint development of the area on the continental 
shelf in the Yellow Sea where the two States have overlapping claims. Technically, 
this agreement does not delimit maritime boundaries. Moreover, this agreement 
on joint development was reached by Japan and South Korea without consultation 
with China. China maintains that the agreement seriously infringes on China’s 
rights and interests in the Yellow Sea and therefore China rejects it.25 Since the 
Japan-Korea Agreement concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part does 
not address maritime boundaries, it will not be discussed further in this paper. 
The Agreement concerning the Establishment of Boundary in the Northern 
Part defines the limit of Japan’s and South Korea’s continental shelves in the Korea 
Strait, however, due to their sovereignty dispute over Takeshima,26 27 the agreement 
fails to establish a boundary line for their continental shelves in the area extending 
from the northernmost point of the Korea Strait specified therein to Takeshima. 
Additionally, a recent controversy between the two States over the name of the Sea 
of Japan28 severely impedes the conclusion of any new delimitation agreements. 
For these reasons, most of their overlapping maritime claims over the Sea of Japan 
have not been resolved. 
B. Boundary Delimitation Issues between Japan and Russia
   
Japan and Russia have overlapping maritime claims in La Perouse Strait and 
the part of the Sea of Japan lying between the two States. However, because of 
25   Zhu Fenglan, Japan-ROK Agreement on Continental Shelf and Its Enlightenment for 
Delimitation of East China Sea, Asia-Pacific Studies, No. 11, 2006, p. 36. (in Chinese)
26      It is called “Dokdo” in South Korea and “Takeshima” in Japan. And it is collectively refer-
red to as “Takeshima” herein for convenience. 
27     G Koo, Economic Dependence and the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute between South Korea and 
Japan, Harvard Asia Quarterly, No. 4, 2005; See BBC News – Profile: Dokdo/Takeshima 
Islands, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19207086, 1 April 2015.
28    South Korea supports the use of the name “East Sea” and Japan supports the name of “Sea 
of Japan” or “Japan Sea”, see South Korea’s assertions on the website of its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, at http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/focus/eastsea/index.jsp?menu=m_20
_10_20, 1 April 2015; see Japan’s assertions on the website of its Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/maritime/japan/index.html, 1 April 2015. 
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their grave disputes over the sovereignty of the Northern Territories29 30 and the 
escalation of such territorial disputes in recent years,31 Japan and Russia have failed 
to carry out any substantial negotiations regarding their maritime boundaries.
C. Boundary Delimitation Issues between North Korea and Russia
Three major agreements were signed by North Korea and the Soviet Union 
which apply to North Korea and Russia’s maritime boundaries today. On 7 April 
1985, North Korea and the Soviet Union, signed the Agreement between the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
concerning the Delimitation of the Soviet-Korean National Border. On 3 September 
1990, they signed the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Korean State Frontier (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Agreement concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Korean 
State Frontier”).32 This second agreement defined the boundary lines of land and 
territorial sea between Soviet and North Korea. On 22 January 1986, they signed 
the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea on the Delimitation of the Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf (hereinafter “Soviet-Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of 
the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf”), which delineated a boundary line 
dividing the economic zone and the continental shelf over which both States have 
overlapping claims. Nevertheless, this agreement ignored and jeopardized South 
Korean and Japanese maritime rights and interests in the Sea of Japan. Since there 
is a general principle in international law with regard to maritime delimitation 
that says a State may not benefit from its own wrongful act, the effectiveness of 
the Soviet-Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of the Economic Zone and the 
29     Northern Territories refer to the Islands of Kunashiri, Habomai, Etorofu and Shikotan.
30    Lv Guixia, Analysis on the Issue of “The Four Northern Islands” of Russian-Japanese 
Relations, Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Science 
Edition), No. 1, 2010. (in Chinese)
31    See BBC News – Kuril Islands Dispute between Russia and Japan, 29 April 2013, at http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11664434, 1 April 2015.
32     Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 
Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea concerning the Regime of 
the Soviet-Korean State Frontier, 3 September 1990, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/RUS-PRK1990SF.PDF, 1 April 
2015.
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Continental Shelf remains controversial, which will be discussed later in this paper.
D. Boundary Delimitation Issues between North and South Koreas 
Due to different political systems and historical factors, North and South 
Koreas have failed to reach any agreements to delimit their overlapping maritime 
claims in the Sea of Japan. On 21 June 1977, North Korea declared its EEZ, 
making it the first State to declare an EEZ in the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, without 
consulting with South Korea, North Korea unilaterally adopted a median line to 
draw its maritime boundary with South Korea.33 In addition, on 1 August 1977, it 
declared a military border area of 50 nm. However, the legitimacy of this area has 
faced challenges and protests from South Korea.34 North Korea claimed a trapezoid 
shaped EEZ in the Sea of Japan, and has adopted a 240-nm-long straight baseline 
which it draws to connect the northeast and southeast corners of its territory.35 In 
order to avoid controversy and conflict, South Korean vessels do not enter this 
claimed area. In February 2000, nongovernmental fisheries associations in North 
and South Koreas negotiated a 5-year agreement that allowed South Korean vessels 
to fish in North Korea’s EEZ until 2005.36 As explained above, North and South 
Koreas have made some attempts to delimit their maritime boundaries, but they 
have not yet entered into any effective delimitation agreement.
E. Boundary Delimitation Issues between South Korea and Russia
Although no formal territorial disputes exist between Russia and South Korea 
in the Sea of Japan, their maritime boundaries technically remain unresolved. South 
33    See Jin-Hyun Paik, Some Legal Issues Relating to Maritime Jurisdictions of North Korea, 
in John P. Craven, Jan Schneider and Carol Stimson eds., The International Implications of 
Extended Maritime Jurisdiction in the Pacific, Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, 1989, pp. 
94~95.
34    Choon-ho Park, The 50-Mile Military Boundary Zone of North Korea, American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 72, 1978; also see Bruce D. Larkin, East Asian Security Zones, 
Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 2, 1980, p. 290.
35     See Jin-Hyun Paik, Some Legal Issues Relating to Maritime Jurisdictions of North Korea, 
in John P. Craven, Jan Schneider and Carol Stimson eds., The International Implications of 
Extended Maritime Jurisdiction in the Pacific, Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, 1989, p. 
103.
36     Agence France Presse, South-North Korean Fishermen’s Accord in Troubled Waters, 28 
February 2000. 
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Korea lies less than 400 nm from Russia across the Sea of Japan, causing their 
allowable EEZs and continental shelves to overlap. Since Japan and Russia have 
yet to resolve their boundary disputes and the applicability of the Soviet-Korea 
Agreement on the Delimitation of the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf is 
questionable, South Korea and Russia’s maritime border remains undefined.
The foregoing analysis shows there are many unresolved overlapping maritime 
boundaries in the Sea of Japan, thus the author has an opportunity to share his 
insight and views on this topic.  
III. An Attempt to Delimit the Overlapping Claims of 
       the States Surrounding the Sea of Japan
A. An Analysis of Delimitation Agreements
Before submitting a concrete proposal to delimit the overlapping claims of 
the States bordering the Sea of Japan, the author must carefully analyze the Japan-
Korea Agreement concerning the Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part 
and the delimitation agreements concluded between North Korea and Russia, 
because there is a general practice in the field of maritime delimitation which says 
that in cases where two States have reached an agreement to resolve a dispute over 
their overlapping maritime claims, and such an agreement does not harm the rights 
and interests enjoyed by any third State, or is not protested or disputed by a third 
State, then courts should respect the boundary determined by that agreement, and 
render their delimitation decisions based on that agreement.37
1. Delimitation Agreements between Japan and South Korea
On 30 January 1974, Japan and South Korea signed the Japan-Korea Agree-
ment concerning the Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part, which estab-
lishes a boundary line in the Korean Strait and the part of sea lying to north of 
North Korea for Japan and South Korea. This agreement adopts a median line to 
draw the boundary of the continental shelf over which the two States lay claims.38 
The southernmost and northernmost points of the boundary line are Point 1 
37    Shi Jiuyong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisdiction of the ICJ, Research on Rule of Law, 
No. 12, 2011, p. 6. (in Chinese)
38     Suk Kyoon Kim, Understanding Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia: Issues and Nature, 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 23, 2008, p. 227.
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(32°57.0' N, 127°41.1' E) and Point 35 (36°10.0' N, 131°15.9' E) respectively. (See 
Fig. 5)
Fig. 5    The Boundary Line in the Korea Strait between Japan and 
South Korea as Specified in the Japan-Korea Agreement concerning the 
Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part39
The boundary line of the continental shelf adjacent to Japan and South Korea, 
as provided in the Japan-Korea Agreement concerning the Establishment of 
Boundary in the Northern Part, is situated within the overlapping areas of the two 
39    Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning the Establishment of 
Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries.
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States, and therefore has not violated the maritime rights and interests of any third 
State. Consequently, the effectiveness of this agreement should be acknowledged 
and accepted, and further delimitation attempts should be made based on this boun-
dary line.
The Korea Strait is 20 nm wide at its narrowest point. Both Japanese and 
South Korean legislation stipulates that their territorial seas extend to 3 nm into 
the Korea Strait, which means that their territorial seas in the Korea Strait and 
the Sea of Japan do not overlap and no dispute over their territorial seas exists. 
However, these two States whose coasts are opposite to each other, do have 14 nm 
of overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims in the Korea Strait at its narrowest 
point. Following the general practice in international maritime delimitation,40 
this paper will adopt a single boundary line to divide the EEZs and continental 
shelves between the two States.41 Since the Japan-Korea Agreement concerning the 
Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part has established a boundary line of 
the continental shelf in the Korean Strait and the part of the Japan Sea appertaining 
40    In international maritime delimitation cases, the single boundary line method has been 
generally employed to delimit the EEZs and continental shelves between disputing States. 
For example, in the Case concerning the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain, the Court pointed out that “the concept of a single maritime 
boundary does not stem from multilateral treaty law but from State practice, and that it finds 
its explanation in the wish of States to establish one uninterrupted boundary line delimiting 
the various – partially coincident – zones of maritime jurisdiction appertaining to them.” 
(See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain), Judgment of 16 March 2001, p. 93, para. 173); as stated by the Court in the Gulf 
of Maine Case, in the case of coincident jurisdictional zones, the determination of a single 
boundary for the different objects of delimitation “can only be carried out by the application 
of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to one 
of these ... objects to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally 
suitable to the division of either of them”, (See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in 
the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment of 12 October 1984, 
p. 327, para. 194). Additionally, the Court contended, “What general international law 
prescribes in every maritime delimitation between neighbouring States could therefore be 
defined as follows: […] (2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of 
equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the 
geographic configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable result.” 
(See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United 
States of America), Judgment of 12 October 1984, pp. 299~300, para. 112). Actually, the 
equitable principle designed for the delimitation of EEZ and continental shelf, as embodied 
in the UNCLOS, is applicable to the delimitation of a single maritime boundary, exactly 
as it is applicable to the division of continental shelf or EEZ separately. (See Shi Jiuyong, 
Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisdiction of the ICJ, Research on Rule of Law, No. 12, 
2011, p. 8. (in Chinese))
41     Shi Jiuyong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisdiction of the ICJ, Research on Rule of Law, 
No. 12, 2011, p. 7. (in Chinese)
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 2)384
to the two States and no third State has been adversely affected, this paper will 
consider this boundary line effective and as the single line dividing their EEZs and 
continental shelves.
2. Delimitation Agreements between North Korea and Russia
The Agreement concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Korean State Frontier 
determines the boundary line of North Korea’s and Russia’s territorial seas by 
adopting an equidistant bisector. This line begins at P(a) situated in the middle 
of the Tumannaya (Tumen) River’s main channel in its mouth, and having the 
geographical coordinates of latitude 42°17'34.34" N and longitude 130°41'49.16" 
E. It runs to P(b) which has the geographical coordinates of latitude 42°09' N and 
longitude 130°53' E. The distance measured from P(a) to P(b) is 12 nm. (See Fig. 
6)
Fig. 6    Boundary Line of Territorial Seas between North Korea and Russia as 
Provided in the Agreement concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Korean State 
Frontier42
The area addressed under the Agreement concerning the Regime of the Soviet-
Korean State Frontier is located within the territorial sea over which North Korea 
and Russia have overlapping claims, and the agreement is not detrimental to a third 
42      The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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State. In addition, the line dividing their territorial seas is a median line equidistant 
from the shores of the two States, therefore it is consistent with the basic principles 
for delimiting the territorial seas of States with adjacent coasts as envisaged by 
UNCLOS. For these reasons, this paper accepts the boundary line of North Korea’s 
and Russia’s territorial seas as determined by the Agreement concerning the 
Regime of the Soviet-Korean State Frontier.
The Soviet-Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of the Economic Zone and 
the Continental Shelf, signed on 22 January 1986, draws a single maritime line to 
divide their EEZs and continental shelves. This boundary line, consisting of two 
line segments, is 202.3 nm long in total. The first line segment, which measures 
176.9 nm, begins from the terminal point of territorial sea boundary (P(b)), runs 
along the equidistance/median line measured from the straight baselines claimed 
by North Korea and Russia, and extends to the Sea of Japan. The second line 
segment, which measures 25.4 nm, starts from a trijunction point (P') 173 nm from 
Cape Povorotnyi in the Russian Federation, Musu Dan in North Korea, and the 
South Korean island of Ulleungdo. It proceeds to a point (P") with coordinates 
of 39°39.3' N, 133°45.0' E, which is equidistant from Russian, South Korean and 
Japanese coasts (See Fig. 7). This agreement does not give full weight to Takeshima 
under international law, since the Soviet Union considered Takeshima to fall under 
the definition of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, making it unable to generate EEZ and 
continental shelf. 
Unlike the Agreement concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Korean State 
Frontier, the second line segment of maritime boundary determined by the Soviet-
Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of the Economic Zone and the Continental 
Shelf (from P' to P"), is detrimental to the maritime rights and interests of South 
Korea. In the practice of international maritime delimitation, if there are no low tide 
elevations, islands, coastline configurations, sea floor faults, or other factors which 
call for an adjustment of the median line, and an unadjusted line will not produce 
inequitable results, then the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitral bodies 
will use the median line to delimit the maritime boundary of the two States. Since 
there are no factors in the part of Japan Sea appertaining to North and South Koreas 
which require an adjustment of the median line between the two States, such a line 
should be deemed as the boundary of their territorial seas, EEZs, and continental 
shelves. As explained above, Point P" is equidistant from South Korea, Japan and 
Russia, but is not equidistant from North and South Koreas. If the line connecting 
Point P" with P(d), which is the starting point of the armistice line between the 
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two Koreas on land, is adopted as the line dividing the maritime boundary of 
Russia and North Korea, it would actually allocate a part of the South Korean EEZ 
and continental shelf to North Korea (shown as the triangle-shaped area in Fig. 
8), to the detriment of South Korean maritime rights. Hence, this paper does not 
acknowledge the effectiveness of the second line segment specified in the Soviet-
Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of the Economic Zone and the Continental 
Shelf.
Fig. 7    Point P' Equidistant from Russia, North Korea and South Korea and 
Point P" Equidistant from Russia, South Korea and Japan Defined in the 
Soviet-Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of the Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf43
43      The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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Fig. 8    The Part of South Korean Sea Area That Would Be Allocated to North 
Korea under the Soviet-Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of the Economic 
Zone and the Continental Shelf (Triangle-Shaped Area on the Map)44
The first line segment defined in the Soviet-Korea Agreement on the Delimi-
tation of the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf runs to Point P' in the Sea 
of Japan. As this point is equidistant from South Korea, Japan and Russia, it does 
not jeopardize the maritime rights and interests of South Korea and other States. 
Therefore, this line segment shall be considered the boundary line delimiting North 
Korea’s and Russia’s EEZs and continental shelves. 
To sum up, the effective maritime boundary lines of States surrounding 
the Sea of Japan include: the line delimiting Japan’s and South Korea’s EEZs 
and continental shelves defined by the Japan-Korea Agreement concerning the 
Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part (Point 1-Point 35), the boundary 
line of North Korea’s and Russia’s territorial seas as specified in the Agreement 
concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Korean State Frontier (P(a)-P(b)), and the first 
44      The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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segment of the boundary line of North Korea’s and Russia’s EEZs and continental 
shelves established by the Soviet-Korea Agreement on the Delimitation of the 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (P(b)-P'). (See Fig. 9)
Fig. 9    Currently Effective Boundary Lines in the Sea of Japan45
B. Sovereignty over Takeshima
It is necessary to draw a boundary line running from Point 35 to a central part 
of the Sea of Japan to delimit the overlapping maritime claims of the States borde-
ring the Sea of Japan, but it is impossible to draw this line without first resolving 
the status of Takeshima. 
Takeshima consists of two main islets, Seodo and Dongdo. Seodo has a sur-
face area of 88,740 m2 and a circumference of 2.6 km; while Dongdo is 73,297 m2 
in area and 2.8 km in circumference. Takeshima is situated at a distance of 87.4 
km (47.2 nm) from the Korean island of Ulleungdo and 157.5 km (85.1 nm) from 
Japan’s Oki Islands. Mainland Korea is at a distance of 216.8 km (117.1 nm) from 
45      The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth. 
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Takeshima.46 (See Fig. 10)
Fig. 10    Location Map of Takeshima47
Takeshima is originally uninhabited. However, the South Korean government 
has made Takeshima a permanent home to two Korean citizens and a Korean tourist 
destination.48 The Takeshima sovereignty dispute stems from the post World War II 
era when Japanese forces retreated from South Korea and is a constant hot spot of 
political conflicts and squabbles between the two States. Regarding Takeshima, two 
issues must be addressed before beginning to delimit the maritime boundaries in the 
Sea of Japan. First, should Takeshima be entitled to its own EEZ and continental 
shelf? Second, which State should possess sovereignty over Takeshima? 
1. Whether Takeshima May Generate an EEZ and Continental Shelf
Article 121(1) of UNCLOS provides that “[a]n island is a naturally formed 
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” and 
paragraph 3 of the same article stipulates that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf.” The protection of the economic interests of coastal populations, 
particularly their dependence upon marine resources for their livelihood and 
economic development, is an important reason for giving EEZ and continental 
46      At http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/introduce/location.jsp, 1 April 2015.
47      At http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/introduce/location.jsp, 1 April 2015.
48      At http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/introduce/residence.jsp, 1 April 2015.
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shelf to islands capable of sustaining human habitation.49 Takeshima, however, 
cannot sustain human habitation of its own. Although South Korea has sent two 
civilians to permanently reside on Takeshima along with approximately another 50 
coast guards, these human actions cannot change the fact that Takeshima is unable 
to sustain human habitation. In light of these facts, Takeshima should be considered 
as rocks under the definition of UNCLOS Article 121(3), and thus should have 
no EEZ or continental shelf. It should be noted that Japan claims that all islands, 
large or small, should have EEZs and continental shelves,50 including Takeshima.51 
This claim is obviously inconsistent with the spirit and provisions of UNCLOS. In 
contrast, South Korea argues that Takeshima cannot generate an EEZ or continental 
shelf since it falls under the stipulations of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS.52
2. Sovereignty over Takeshima
Regarding sovereignty over Takeshima, Japan claims: (1) Japanese people 
have explored Takeshima since the 17th century. In the early 17th century, Japanese 
fisherman used Takeshima as an area to hunt and gather marine resources such as 
sea lions and abalone. In the early 1900s, the sea lion hunting business became a 
full-scale industry; (2) Japan has established territorial sovereignty over Takeshima. 
In the early 1900s, the residents of Shimane Prefecture called for a stable environ-
ment to conduct their sea lion hunting business. Against this backdrop, the Japanese 
Cabinet decided to incorporate Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture and reaffir-
med its sovereignty over Takeshima; (3) Japan’s sovereignty over Takeshima is 
recognized by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the international community. 
In the process of drafting the San Francisco Peace Treaty, South Korea requested 
that the United States add Takeshima to the territories to be renounced by Japan. 
However, the United States unequivocally rejected this request, noting that 
Takeshima had never been treated as part of Korea; (4) South Korea has illegally 
occupied Takeshima. In 1952, South Korean president Syngman Rhee unilaterally 
49    “Volga” (Russian Federation v. Australia), Prompt Release, Judgment, Declaration of Judge 
Vukas, ITLOS Reports 2002, paras. 3~5, at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/
cases/case_no_11/11_judgment_231202_dec_Vukas_en.pdf, 1 April 2015.
50    Mark J. Valencia, Domestic Politics Fuels Northeast Asian Maritime Disputes, Asia Pacific 
Issues, Vol. 2, 2000.
51    Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: A Case Study of the 
Russian Federation, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 302 (citing Japanese 
Annual of International Law, 1986, No. 29, p. 131).
52     Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems – Status and 
Solutions, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, p. 113. 
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established what is known as the “Syngman Rhee Line,” placing Takeshima on the 
South Korean side of the line and subsequently occupying it. Furthermore, Japan 
has repeatedly proposed to South Korea that the sovereignty dispute be referred to 
the ICJ, but South Korea has rejected each of these proposals.53
On the other side, South Korea contends: (1) Korean people have explored 
Takeshima since very early in history. Numerous early Korean government 
publications have mentioned Takeshima, including Sejong Sillok, Jiriji (1454) 
(Geography Section of the Annals of King Sejong’s Reign) and Sinjeung Dongguk 
Yeoji Seungnam (1531) (Revised and Augmented Edition of the Survey of the 
Geography of Korea); (2) Japan illegally incorporated Takeshima into its territories 
in 1905. Japan had been at war with Russia over its interests in the Korean 
peninsula since 1904. In 1905, in order to meet its military needs, Japan incor-
porated Takeshima into Japanese territories through Shimane Prefecture Public 
Notice No. 40. At that time Korea was subject to Japanese aggression and control 
and powerless to claim its territorial sovereignty; (3) Japan’s sovereignty over 
Takeshima has been denied by the international community as the World War II 
came to its end. Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated that “Japan will also be expelled 
from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” Take-
shima was not explicitly mentioned in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and this 
treaty also does not suggest that Takeshima should be excluded from the list of 
Korean territories taken by Japan; (4) Korea has the territorial rights ab initio over 
Takeshima and should not need to seek the verification of such rights before an 
international court; and (5) South Korea has at all times exercised its sovereignty 
over Takeshima. Since South Korea took control over Takeshima in the 1950s, a 
South Korean police force has been stationed on Takeshima, patrolling the island; 
various laws and regulations including those specific to Takeshima have been 
enacted and implemented; a lighthouse and other facilities have been established 
and in operation on Takeshima; and Korean civilians are residing on Takeshima.54
Two factors, namely effective occupation and critical date, should be clarified 
before determining which State holds sovereignty over Takeshima, because these 
factors are decisive in settling territorial sovereignty disputes. 
In the Case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia v. Malaysia), the ICJ found that a claim to sovereignty based on 
53      At http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/territory/takeshima/data.html, 1 April 2015.
54      At http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/cn/dokdo/faq.jsp, 1 April 2015. 
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continued display of authority involved two elements: 1) the intention and will to 
act as sovereign and 2) some actual exercise or display of such authority.55 This 
requirement may be satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of 
such authority in cases where very small uninhabited islands or territories are 
concerned.56 In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. United Kingdom), 
both France and the UK claimed sovereignty over a group of islets and rocks lying 
between the British island of Jersey and the coast of France, as this area was rich 
in fishing resources.57 Both parties contended that they had historic rights to this 
area supported by evidence from medieval documents, but the ICJ decided that 
both parties’ actual display of sovereignty over the group in the 19th and 20th 
centuries was a more critical element, because the medieval documents were not 
conclusive.58 The UK had exercised criminal jurisdiction over this group of islets 
and rocks, levied local taxes on the houses or huts on these islets, and maintained 
a registry of fishing boats and contracts of sale relating to real property on these 
islets.59 However, similar acts involving a manifestation of State authority over 
these islets by the France cannot be found. Therefore, based on the more recent 
display of British sovereignty, the ICJ ultimately declared that the disputed islets 
belonged to UK.60
The term “critical date” refers to the time when a formal dispute arises. 
Any displays of authority after that date should not be considered when settling 
the dispute. Identifying this date is important to prevent one of the parties from 
unilaterally improving its position and from gaining any advantage by rejecting 
or evading a settlement.61 Although the critical date has been important in some 
cases, tribunals in other cases have been reluctant to set a specific date and have 
instead allowed the parties to introduce evidence of events that occurred until the 
55    Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), Judgment of 17 
December 2002, p. 682, para. 134. 
56     Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 
1975, p. 43, para. 92.
57     Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom), Judgment of 17 November 1953, p. 53
58    Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom), Judgment of 17 November 1953, pp. 
56~57.
59    Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom), Judgment of 17 November 1953, pp. 
65~66, 69.
60    Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom), Judgment of 17 November 1953, pp. 
53~72.
61    Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime 
Boundary, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 38, 2007, p. 163.
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time of litigation. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, for instance, France held 
that 2 August 1839 was the critical date, but Britain argued that the dispute had not 
crystallized until the countries concluded their agreement to submit the dispute to 
the ICJ. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Britain’s favor.62 However, in the case of the 
sovereignty dispute over Takeshima, the critical date is not as important for the 
following three reasons: 1) South Korea only acquired its independence in 1948, 
2) relations between the two States were only normalized in 1965, and 3) the 
Takeshima dispute only crystallized in recent years. Given the recentness of this 
dispute, its settlement should follow the practice established in the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos Case, meaning that all evidence of events prior to the final resolution of 
the dispute should be taken into account. 
Considering the reasons and evidence produced by South Korea and Japan to 
support their claims of sovereignty over Takeshima, as well as effective possession 
and other factors, the author asserts that Takeshima should belong to South Korea 
for the following reasons.
First, in terms of historical evidence, South Korea has presented numerous 
documents proving Korea’s historical exercise of jurisdiction over Takeshima; 
however, Japan has little such evidence. 
Second, although Japan argues that its display of authority is manifested in 
its incorporation of Takeshima into its territories in 1905 and its continued control 
of the island until 1945, historical facts show that South Korea was controlled 
by Japan during this time period. We cannot expect a colonized country to stage 
effective protests or effectively display its authority to protect its territorial interests 
when it is under the control of another State. 
Third, that South Korea has regained control of Takeshima following 
Japan’s retreat from South Korea, and has effectively controlled the island since 
then is reflected by the fact that since regaining control, South Korea has at all 
times administered Takeshima by enacting laws governing the island, erecting 
a lighthouse on the island, and sending police forces to station there. In the case 
of a small island which is remote from the mainland and hardly inhabited, such 
acts show a display of sovereignty and are sufficient to satisfy the requirement of 
effective possession. In contrast, in the time following Japan’s retreat from South 
62    Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom), Judgment of 17 November 1953, pp. 
59~60. Also see Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) 
Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 
14, 1974, pp. 221, 229.
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Korea in 1945, Japan has hardly displayed its sovereignty over Takeshima, except 
to nominally claim its sovereignty over the island. 
C. An Attempt to Delimit the Undefined Overlapping Areas in 
    the Sea of Japan
High seas do not exist in the Sea of Japan. If circles with a radius of 200 nm 
are drawn from Cape Povorotnyi in Russian Federation, Musu Dan in North Korea, 
the South Korean island of Ulleungdo, and the westernmost point P(f) of Japan’s 
Noto Peninsula, respectively, we will find that the Sea of Japan is situated within 
the 200 nm EEZ of each State. In other words, the EEZs claimed by Japan and 
Russia, North Korea and Russia, North Korea and South Korea, South Korea and 
Japan, and South Korea and Russia all overlap; therefore, there are no high seas in 
the Sea of Japan. In light of this fact, this paper will proceed to delimit the maritime 
boundaries of these States. 
This paper adopts the “equitable delimitation method,” which is a relatively 
reasonable and fair method developed from actual maritime delimitations. This 
method has been used for over half a century and is often applied by the ICJ and 
other international courts.63 It can be employed to delimit the territorial seas, 
EEZs, and continental shelves of States with adjacent or opposite coasts. And 
it involves a three-stage process. First, the relevant coastlines and baselines are 
identified in order to draw a provisional median line; second, relevant factors, 
63    The statistics collected by the author indicate that over the last half a century, international 
maritime delimitation cases settled by applying the equitable method mainly include: 
(1) Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case of 1977, (2) Case concerning the Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) of 1982, (3) Case concerning Delimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area of 1984, (4) Case concerning Continental 
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) of 1985, (5) Maritime Delimitation between Guinea 
and Guinea-Bissau of 1985, (6) Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and 
the French Republic (St Pierre et Miquelon) of 1992, (7) Case concerning the Maritime 
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway) of 1993, 
(8) The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration of 1999, (9) Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) of 2001, (10) Case 
concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) of 2002, (11) The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago 
Arbitration of 2006, (12) The Guyana/Suriname Arbitration of 2007, (13) Case concerning 
the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean 
Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) of 2007, (14) Case concerning the Maritime Delimitation in 
the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) of 2009 and (15) Case concerning the Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) of 2012.
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including geographical and non-geographical aspects, are considered to assess 
whether the line needs to be adjusted or shifted to achieve an equitable result; and 
third, a “disproportionality test” is employed to see whether there is any significant 
disproportion in the areas allocated to each State as a result of the delimitation, and 
adjust the line if there is a significant disproportion. Consideration of the factors 
which can be used to adjust the provisional median line plays a prominent role in 
this delimitation method. Such factors include, inter alia, baselines, existence of 
prior delimitation agreements, the configuration of the coastlines in the disputed sea 
area, the existence of islands and low tide elevations, the ratio of coastline lengths, 
and the interests of a third State. 
As mentioned above, following the general practice used in international 
maritime delimitations, this paper will adopt a single boundary line to divide the 
overlapping EEZs and continental shelves of the States bordering the Sea of Japan.
1. Maritime Boundary Delimitation between North and South Koreas
In accordance with the equitable delimitation method, the first step is to 
draw an equidistance/median line between the two Koreas in the area of their 
overlapping claims. The two Koreas are States with adjacent coasts, and their land 
border is the Armistice Line which lies on the 38th parallel north as agreed by the 
two States at the end of the Korean War. Therefore, this paper chooses the starting 
Point P(d) of the Armistice Line, a low-water point, as the starting point for the 
provisional median line. Then the terminal point of this provisional line should 
be decided. As indicated above, Point P' is a trijunction equidistant from the two 
Koreas and Russia; specifically, it is 173 nm both from North Korea’s Musu Dan 
and South Korea’s Ulleungdo island. Hence, point P' is selected as the terminal 
point of the median line for the two Koreas. In this case, the line linking Point P(d) 
with P' should be regarded as the provisional median line dividing the territorial 
seas, EEZs, and continental shelves of the two Koreas. (See Fig. 11). 
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Fig. 11    Boundary of Territorial Seas, EEZ and Continental Shelf between the 
Two Koreas64
After the provisional median line is drawn, it needs to be seen if there are 
factors which require the line to be adjusted or shifted. Obviously, the South 
Korean island of Ulleungdo is an important factor to take into account, because 
it is an island which can sustain human habitation and economic life and thus is 
able to generate a 200 nm EEZ and continental shelf. However, an initial survey 
shows that the distance from Ulleungdo to the provisional line is approximately 
equivalent to the one from North Korea’s Musu Dan to the line, with both distances 
being about 100 nm, which implies that the existence of Ulleungdo will not result 
in a disproportionate increase of South Korean sea areas and a sharp decrease 
of North Korean sea areas. Consequently, Ulleungdo is not a factor requiring 
64      The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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an adjustment of the provisional median line. Furthermore, an examination of 
the two Koreas’ seabed geomorphology near the provisional line indicates that 
isobaths gradually increase towards the Japan Basin in the direction from Point 
P(d) to P' and no obvious sea floor faults are found in the area in question. Thus 
the seabed geomorphologic features also do not require a readjustment of the 
provisional median line. Finally, North Korea’s unilateral assertion that the straight 
baseline connecting Point P(a) to Musu Dan and to Point P(d) should be used as its 
territorial sea baselines is not consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, and thus 
the author rejects its effect. And the author concludes that the provisional median 
line does not need to be adjusted since an equitable result can be produced without 
adjusting the line. In other words, the line connecting point P(d) with P' should be 
the boundary line delimiting the territorial seas, EEZs, and continental shelves of 
the two Koreas.
2. Maritime Boundary Delimitation between South Korea and Japan
First, a provisional equidistance/median line between South Korea and Japan 
should be drawn in the area where their claims overlap. Taking into account the 
geographical conditions of the two States in the Sea of Japan, the author selects a 
low-water point on the South Korean island of Ulleungdo and another on Japan’s 
Oki Islands at the location where their coasts are opposite. The line which connects 
Point 35 (starting point) with the middle point between the two low-water points 
and runs into the Sea of Japan should be adopted as the first provisional median 
line. Then the same approach is employed to draw the second provisional median 
line between Korea’s Ulleungdo island and Japan’s Noto Peninsula. The terminal 
point of this second line is Point P" because it is a trijunction equidistant from 
South Korea, Japan and Russia. If this line extends further northward, the maritime 
rights and interests of Russia would be undermined. Point P(g) is devised as the 
junction between the two provisional median lines. Therefore, the line linking Point 
35 to P(g) and to P" should be used as the provisional median line between South 
Korea and Japan (See Fig. 12). This line should also be the provisional median line 
used for dividing the EEZs and continental shelves of South Korea and Japan. 
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Fig. 12    The Provisional Median Line Dividing the EEZs and Continental 
Shelves between South Korea and Japan in the Sea of Japan 
(Point 35-P(g)-P")65
After the provisional median line between two States is drawn in the area of 
their overlapping claims, relevant factors should be considered to assess whether 
the line needs to be adjusted or shifted. Such factors include Takeshima, seabed 
geomorphology, and the ratio of coastline lengths. As explained above, Takeshima 
is a group of rocks under the definition of UNCLOS Article 121(3), which does not 
have an EEZ or continental shelf. If the middle point between Takeshima and the 
Oki Islands is selected to draw a provisional median line between Japan and South 
Korea, then the median line will be the line connecting Point 35 to P(m) and to P" 
(the dotted line in Fig.12). This line would disproportionately expand South Korea’s 
EEZ and reduce Japan’s EEZ. This is the reason why this paper chooses not to use 
65     The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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the middle point between Takeshima and the Oki Islands to draw the median line. 
Furthermore, Takeshima is about 22 nm from the first provisional median line (i.e., 
the line connecting Point 35 with P(g)), which is beyond the breadth of its own 
12-nm territorial sea. As a result, the existence of Takeshima does not require an 
adjustment or shifting of the line. Secondly, no sea floor faults or other geological 
conditions which may affect the location of the provisional line are detected in the 
overlapping area of the continental shelf between South Korea and Japan. Finally, 
an examination of the coast configurations and coastline lengths of the two States 
suggests that they do not result in a disproportionate increase or decrease in the 
size of the maritime areas possessed by either State, it therefore cannot constitute 
a reason requiring an adjustment of this line. Without the need for adjustments, the 
provisional median line between South Korea and Japan (the line linking Point 35 
to P(g) and to P") should be the line delimiting the EEZs and continental shelves of 
these two States. 
3. Maritime Boundary Delimitation between Japan and Russia
The provisional median line in the Sea of Japan between Japan and Russia, 
which are States with opposite coasts, starts from P", a point equidistant from 
Japan, South Korea and Russia, and runs along the Sea of Japan to the end point of 
La Perouse Strait (P(h)). (See Fig. 13)
Two factors needs to be considered when drawing the provisional median line 
between Japan and Russia: one concerns La Perouse Strait and the other relates to 
the area in the Sea of Japan beyond the strait. La Perouse Strait is 23.2 nm wide at 
its narrowest point. Russian legislation provides that Russia has a 12 nm territorial 
sea. Japanese laws stipulate that Japan’s territorial sea in this strait extends to 3 nm. 
Although these provisions indicate there is no overlap in territorial seas between 
Japan and Russia, there is 8.2 nm of overlapping claims pertaining to the EEZs and 
continental shelves of these two States in La Perouse Strait. To show due respect 
for the legislations of the States concerned, at the narrowest point in this strait, the 
provisional median line between Japan and Russia should be adjusted southward so 
that the line is 16.1 nm from Krillion Cape, Sakhalin, Russia and 7.1 nm from Soya 
Cape, Kyushu Island, Japan. This adjusted median line should be the line dividing 
the EEZs and continental shelves of Japan and Russia. 
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Fig. 13    The Provisional Median Line Dividing the EEZs and Continental 
Shelves between Russia and Japan in the Sea of Japan (P"-P(h))66
A comprehensive examination of the area in the Sea of Japan beyond the 
La Perouse Strait shows that there is no island in the said area which calls for an 
adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line between these two States, 
and the marine geomorphology, coastal configurations, and coastline lengths of the 
two States in their overlapping areas will not lead to a disproportionate increase or 
decrease of the sea areas enjoyed by either State, therefore there is no need to make 
any further adjustments. 
4. Maritime Boundary Delimitation between South Korea and Russia
In order to delimit the maritime boundary between South Korea and Russia, 
the provisional median line between the two should be determined first. This line 
should be the line connecting Point P' with P", because P' is equidistant from North 
Korea, South Korea, and Russia and P" is equidistant from South Korea, Russia, 
66      The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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and Japan. (See Fig. 14)
Fig. 14    The Provisional Median Line Dividing the EEZs and Continental 
Shelves between Russia and South Korea in the Sea of Japan (P'-P")67
    
After a careful examination of South Korea’s and Russia’s overlapping EEZ 
and continental shelf claims, the author finds that there is no island or other circum-
stances in the said area which have a significant effect on the provisional median 
line between the two States. Nor are there any sea floor faults or other geological 
conditions which call for an adjustment or shifting of the line. Given no need for 
adjustment, the provisional median line connecting P' with P" should be adopted as 
the line delimiting the EEZs and continental shelves between these two States. 
In conclusion, the line dividing the territorial seas, EEZs, and continental 
shelves between North and South Koreas should be the line connecting P' with 
P(d); the line delimiting the EEZs and continental shelves between South Korea and 
Japan should be the line linking Point 1 to P(g) and to P" ; the line delimiting the 
67     The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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EEZs and continental shelves between Japan and Russia should be the line linking 
P" with P(h); and the line dividing the EEZs and continental shelves between South 
Korea and Russia should be the line connecting P' with P". The final delimitation 
result is shown in Fig. 15.
Fig. 15    Maritime Boundary Lines between the States Adjacent to the Sea of 
Japan68
IV. Concluding Remarks
As mentioned above, except for some partially effective maritime delimitation 
agreements, most of the Sea of Japan is subject to overlapping claims by neigh-
boring States. For this reason, this paper attempts to delimit the maritime boun-
daries of the States bordering the Sea of Japan. To aid in this process, this paper 
68      The map is drawn by the author based on Google Earth.
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adopts the equitable delimitation method, since this method is effective as proven 
by being successfully used to solve international maritime boundary disputes for 
half a century. In this paper, the author presents a detailed delimitation proposal for 
resolving the overlapping maritime boundaries of the States bordering the Sea of 
Japan.
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